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In this paper I extend the multiple application urn-ball game structure,
introduced by Gautier and Moraga-Gonzalez (2004) and Albrecht, Gautier,
and Vroman (2006), to an scenario where ￿rms can, after a rejection, make
additional wage o⁄ers. This expands the game structure from a one-shot set
up to a sequential game. A ￿rm, after being rejected by an applicant, can
choose another applicant to make him a new wage o⁄er. This possibility gives
￿rms an outside option after a rejection. This increases the bargaining power
of ￿rms, implying a change in their wage o⁄er behavior. The resulting wage
distribution is hump-shaped with the density of wage o⁄ers concentrated on
central values, rather than in extreme values.
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The matching process is one of the most relevant features of the labor market.
The matching process describes the mechanism that is required to join ￿rms with
workers. This mechanism is complex and not necessarily e¢ cient. In fact, there is
strong evidence of involuntary unemployment together with the existence of empty
job vacancies. The literature mostly uses exogenous matching functions to describe
this mechanism. See Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001) for an extensive survey of the
matching literature.
A microfounded and intuitive way to describe the labor market, the Urn-Ball
game structure, was introduced by Butters (1977), Hall (1979) and Pissarides (1979).
This structure describes the matching process as a game where workers submit
applications, symbolically described as balls, to job vacancies, symbolically described
as urns. Each worker has a single ball that she must introduce in one of the urns,
simultaneously with the rest of workers. An urn with at least one ball chooses
randomly one of them, forming a match with that particular worker. A coordination
problem arises when workers choose simultaneously to which vacancies they apply,
since they are uniformed about the decisions of the rest of the workers. There is
a positive probability that a vacancy does not receive any application remaining
un￿lled, while at the same time some workers are left unemployed, since they were
not randomly chosen to ful￿ll the vacancy where they applied.
This kind of structure has been used to describe unemployment, unemployment
duration, and also wage di⁄erentials and wage dispersion (Montgomery (1991), Lang
(1991), Blanchard and Diamond (1994)).
Perhaps the most signi￿cant drawback in the standard urn-ball game is the fact
that workers submit a single application, being then constrained to receive a unique
o⁄er that must be accepted. Lang (1991) constructs a model where workers apply
to at least two ￿rms, but the complete multiple application structure is described
in Albrecht, Gautier and Vroman (2006), AVG hereafter. In a multiple application
structure, workers send applications to several ￿rms, being then possible to receive
multiple o⁄ers. This makes the wage bargaining mechanism highly relevant, since
1￿rms may compete for the same worker. The bargaining mechanism proposed by
AVG is a wage posting set up. Firms post the reservation wage and, in the case that
more than one ￿rm is interested in the same worker, they engage in a Bertrand com-
petition. Bertrand competition yields a wage o⁄er equal to the value of production.
The result is a wage distribution concentrated in the two extreme values, the reser-
vation wage and the full production value. This structure implicitly implies that
￿rms have information about the existence of a competitor. Gautier and Moraga-
Gonzalez (2005), GM-G hereafter, develop a more natural informational structure.
Firms are not aware of other possible competitors, but they know that there is a
positive probability that their chosen worker receives additional o⁄ers. Firms do
not post wages, but vacancies, and once they choose randomly one of the received
applications, they make a single take-it-or-leave-it wage o⁄er. Workers collect o⁄ers
and accept the highest one. This structure is identical to a sealed bid ￿rst-price
auction with an unknown number of bidders, where all bidders value identically the
worker. The result is a mixed strategy of ￿rms. They extract their wage o⁄er from a
continuous distribution that goes from the reservation wage to an upper bound that
is strictly lower than the production value. The resulting wage distribution seems
more intuitive than the one obtained by AVG, with just two possible outcomes.
However, the resulting wage distribution has a strictly increasing density function,
with most of the density concentrated around the highest value. Halko, Kultti and
Virrankoski (2008) obtain a hump-shaped wage distribution using a similar mecha-
nism. They assume that agents make in￿nite applications and they can choose the
direction in which the market develops. Workers can choose to send applications
to ￿rms, receiving then wage o⁄ers from them, or to be contacted by ￿rms, making
then workers a wage o⁄er to ￿rms. In this second case, ￿rms are the ones who
collect wage o⁄ers, choosing the worker that o⁄ers the lowest wage. The result of
such game is the mentioned hump-shaped wage o⁄er structure with a ￿ at area in
the middle.
In this paper I follow the work of GM-G. Firms will not post wages, just vacan-
cies. Firms make take-it-or-leave-it wage o⁄ers simultaneously, without information
about the o⁄ers that the agent might receive. The intention is to extend that model
to a more natural scenario. In GM-G the resulting game is a one-shot game. This
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￿rms. Workers control a given number of applications that might end up in multiple
wage o⁄ers, while ￿rms compete for a single worker. Firms do not have any out-
side option, even in the case that they have a large set of applications. Firms that
are rejected do not ￿nd a worker and their job vacancy remains un￿lled. It seems
natural to think that a ￿rm with several applications can, after a rejection, take
another application from the pool and make a new o⁄er, having then an outside
option. Allowing recall, ￿rms can make further o⁄ers, depending on the number
of received applications. Recall is treated in Kircher (2008) in a directed search,
simultaneous, labor network, where ￿rms post wages. The e¢ ciency result obtained
by Kircher will not hold in the sequential set up that I propose. Moreover, there is
also a signi￿cant di⁄erence in the fact that in my model ￿rms wage o⁄ers are not
posted. The wage structure will depend on the applications made by workers, while
in Kircher the applications depend on the posted wages.
In this paper I present a model where workers and ￿rms are ex-ante identical.
However, ex-ante identical ￿rms behave di⁄erently once their type is revealed. The
type is given by the number of rounds in which the ￿rm can make wage o⁄ers, if
needed. Since workers cannot coordinate in the number of applications they send,
neither on where they apply, not all ￿rms receive the same number of applications.
The type of the ￿rm is then stochastically determined, after workers have send their
applications.
Workers observe the number of job vacancies and the total number of workers
looking for a job. They choose the number of applications they wish to make and
send them to di⁄erent job vacancies.1 Firms collect applications and list them
randomly, since agents are ex-ante homogenous. The list gives the order in which
￿rms will make wage o⁄ers. Firms o⁄er then, simultaneously and privately, a take-
it-or-leave-it wage o⁄er to the ￿rst applicant in the list. Workers collect wage o⁄ers
and accept the highest one, forming a match. Both the matched ￿rm and the worker
exit the market, but this information is not public. This ￿rst round is as in the model
presented in GM-G. The extension is to allow unmatched ￿rms to proceed through
1In the presented paper the number of applications is treated as an exogenous choice.
3their application list, making further rounds of wage o⁄ers. This implies that any
￿rm that was rejected in a wage o⁄er round and that still has applications in her
list, can make another wage o⁄er to the next applicant in the list. This sequential
wage o⁄er process goes on until the ￿rm wage o⁄er is accepted, forming a match,
or the list is exhausted. If the list ends, the vacancy remains un￿lled. There is then
a positive probability that a vacancy is un￿lled and a worker remains unemployed,
unless all workers apply to all vacancies. The number of wage o⁄er rounds can be
very large, making very di¢ cult to deal with the full model. However, the number
of wage o⁄er rounds can be exogenously determined. The result of the model is
clearly a⁄ected by this choice.
Firms are, therefore, ex-post heterogenous, depending on the number of applica-
tions they receive. This number determines how many bargaining rounds they can
be active in the market. This implies a di⁄erent behavior according to the type of
the ￿rm, since the value of the outside option depends on the type. This is equivalent
to say that ￿rms do not value identically the worker. In fact they give a di⁄erent
value in each round, depending on the value of the outside option. Consequently,
wage o⁄ers are di⁄erent across types. Firms solve their problem mainly through
mixed strategies, but the support of the wage distributions di⁄ers across ￿rms. In
fact, wage o⁄er supports do not overlap, since ￿rms compete only with those of their
own type, losing against all ￿rms of a lower type and winning against higher type
￿rms. Also the number of ￿rms and the number of workers that are active in the
market gets lower as rounds go on. Workers leave the market if they form a match
or if their applications are all in ￿rms that have already found a worker. Firms leave
the market if they make a match or if they do not have more applications in their
list.
This exclusion of types is due to the di⁄erences in the expected pro￿t related to
further wage o⁄er rounds. In any bargaining round, a particular type of ￿rm will be
playing her last round, making an o⁄er to the last application in her list. This implies
that she has no outside option and if she does not make a match in that round, her
vacancy remains un￿lled. The rest of active ￿rms have at least one additional round,
so they still expect a positive pro￿t if rejected. Firms in their last round will behave
4aggressively, making a high wage o⁄er in order to increase the probability to get a
worker. Those with additional rounds behave less aggressively, since they still have
a positive outside option. Their wage o⁄er supports do not overlap, implying that
￿rms are not interested in a competition between types. Lower types will make wage
o⁄ers that overrun any o⁄er made by higher type ￿rms.
This implies that in each round the wage o⁄ers can be separated, according to
types, in di⁄erent supports. Since the distribution of ￿rms types follows a binomial
distribution, the wage o⁄ers will follow a similar distribution. This leads to a hump-
shaped wage o⁄er distribution where most of wage o⁄ers are concentrated on central
values rather than on extreme values, i.e. in the ￿rst round, ￿rms with just one
applicant will o⁄er high wages, those with two applications will o⁄er wages in a
support just below the o⁄ers made by ￿rms with a single application, ￿rms with three
applications in a support below those o⁄ers made by ￿rms with two applications and
so on. Since the amount of ￿rms of each type follows a binomial distribution, related
to market tightness and the number of applications, the amount of o⁄ers made in
each subset of wages will follow a similar distribution.
The number of applications made by workers a⁄ects the wage o⁄er distribution,
a⁄ecting the wage that workers expect to receive. This relation is not monotonic
provided that the number of workers is higher than the number of vacancies. If
workers make a single application it is optimal for ￿rms to o⁄er the reservation wage.
If all workers apply to all ￿rms it is also optimal for ￿rms to o⁄er the reservation
wage, since at some round the reservation wage will be accepted. This implies that,
if there are more workers than ￿rms, even if sending applications has no cost, it is
never optimal to apply to all ￿rms or to make an in￿nite number of applications.
In the description of the model, the behavior of workers accepting wages may be
seen as too naive. They take the highest o⁄er received in a particular round ignoring
the possibility of receiving a better o⁄er in the future. This seems counterintuitive
because workers might wish to reject an o⁄er if it is below the wage they expect
to get in a later round. There is an informational asymmetry that explains this
fact. Workers are not aware of the bargaining round as long as ￿rms do not provide
information about the ful￿llment of their vacancies. A worker is active in a particular
5round because she has not received any o⁄er in previous rounds, so she has no
information about her position in the list nor about the round that is currently
going on. This informational asymmetry is enough to make her accept the highest
o⁄er received in a particular bargaining round.
2 Model
The model is intuitively simple but mathematically complex to solve. The matching
mechanism of the economy is described as an urn-ball game with multiple applica-
tions and recall. Recall is considered as the option of ￿rms to make additional wage
o⁄er rounds if they were previously rejected. The process is sequential, but within
each step, all acting agents make simultaneous choices.
The economy is composed by N workers looking for a job and V ￿rms posting
a single job vacancy. All ￿rms and workers are ex-ante homogenous. Moreover, N
and V are observable and large.2 Once job vacancies are posted, workers send a
number S of applications to di⁄erent vacancies. Workers choose randomly where to
send their applications. Each application has a cost c for the agent. Firms collect
applications and list them randomly. Then, a set of sequential rounds of contacts
starts. Each ￿rm contacts workers sequentially, according to her list, making a take-
it-or-leave-it wage o⁄er W to the corresponding applicant until the o⁄er is accepted
or the list ends.3 In each of these rounds, workers collect wage o⁄ers and accept the
highest one they have at that moment, forming a match.4 All workers and ￿rms that
have formed a match exit the market. Firms that have not formed a match start
a new wage o⁄er round if they still have applications in their list. Firms without a
match and without further applications exit the market as un￿lled vacancies.
Step by step, the market works as follows:5
2Large enough to apply asymptotic properties for the probability distributions.
3In each round the o⁄er can be di⁄erent, a round subscript is omitted for simplicity.
4Ties are solved randomly, an o⁄er below the reservation wage w is rejected.
5T subscript denotes the current round of o⁄ers, K subscript denotes ￿rm or application
type.
61. The number of workers looking for a job, N, and the number of ￿rms that open
a single job vacancy, V , is observed by all participants. The market tightness
￿, expressed as the ratio
V
N
, is therefore known by all agents.
2. Workers choose the number S of applications they make. Each application has
a cost c for the worker.
3. Firms collect applications and order them randomly in a list. The list can
have a maximum length of N, but the number of rounds where the ￿rm can
make o⁄ers might be lower. The maximum number of rounds where a ￿rm
can be active, that is, the highest possible type, is given by R = minfV;Ng.
However, the number of rounds can be exogenously ￿xed to any R lower than
R. Firms learn their type K, where K is the number of rounds where the ￿rm
can make o⁄ers. The type is equal to the length of the application list as long
as it is shorter than R. The type is R if the list is larger or equal than R.
Firms type is private information.
4. Firms make a take-it-or-leave-it wage o⁄er WT;K to the corresponding appli-
cant in the list.6
5. Workers that are still in the market collect o⁄ers. If they receive at least one
o⁄er above their reservation wage w, they accept the highest o⁄er received and
exit the market. This happens with probability DT.
6. Firms with an accepted o⁄er form a match and exit the market. This happens
with probability MT;K.
7. A formed match produces a value Q. Firms gain Q ￿ WT;K and workers
WT;K ￿ Sc.
8. Firms with no remaining applications in their list exit the market. This hap-
pens to all ￿rms of type K = T that are still in the market.
9. Rejected ￿rms of type K > T go to the next round, starting again from step
4.
6The particular wage o⁄er will be random, the distribution depends on round and type.
7Workers are assumed to take the highest o⁄er received in the current round. This
behavior seems naive, since workers can reject all o⁄ers below the highest expected
o⁄er of the next round. That is, they could update their reservation wage every
round. If they do not do so, it is because they do not know in which round they
have received the o⁄er. The unique information that workers have are the received
o⁄ers, but they do not now how many rounds have gone without receiving o⁄ers.
This lack of information forces workers to accept the highest current o⁄er.7
Workers and ￿rms commit to the formed matches and to the accepted wages.
This implies that a formed match cannot be broken. Matched workers reject all
o⁄ers received in further rounds, even if they imply a higher wage. Matched ￿rms
do not make further wage o⁄ers trying to ￿nd a cheaper worker.
If the maximum number of active rounds is set to one, R = 1, this model boils
down to the model by GM-G. Increasing the number of rounds above one gives ￿rms
an outside option after a rejection. Firms bargaining power is, therefore, increased
with respect to GM-G and their wage o⁄er behavior changes. Firms will o⁄er wages
according to their ex-post revealed type. Firms of lower types act more aggressively
than those of higher types, as there are fewer rounds in which they can be active in
the market. They are more eager to get a worker, making then higher wage o⁄ers
in order to overrun the o⁄ers made by ￿rms with a higher type.
In fact, the equilibrium result is such that the optimal wage o⁄er distributions of
di⁄erent types do not overlap in a particular round. Firms compete in each round
with the ￿rms of their own type. They lose against ￿rms of lower type and they win
against ￿rms of higher type.
The model becomes highly complicated due to the construction of the probabil-
ities involved. The probability structure must be solved recursively starting from
the ￿rst round until round R.
7The reservation wage is exogenously given. However, given the probabilistic structure
of the game, it might be possible to endogenously determine a constant reservation wage
w to be used in all rounds. This does not change the fact that agents accept the highest
o⁄er received at the current round.
82.1 Probability construction
Agents send S applications to V ￿rms. The probability that a particular agent sends
an application to a particular ￿rm is
S
V
. The number of applications that a ￿rm
receives is stochastically determined. The probability distribution of ￿rms ex-post
types follows a censored binomial from 0 to R. Type R accumulates the probabilities
that correspond to ￿rms with at least R applications. The probability distribution













if K < R (1)














if K = R, (2)
where FK denotes the probability that a particular ￿rm is a type K ￿rm and the
type denotes the number of rounds where the ￿rm can be active, if she did not exit
the market previously.
Since ￿rms are ex-post of di⁄erent types, applications are also di⁄erent because
they have been received by ￿rms of di⁄erent types. That is, a particular application
may end up in a ￿rm with no other applicants, a type 1 ￿rm, or it may end up
in a ￿rm with 9 other applicants, a type 10 ￿rm.8 The probability distribution of
applications ex-post types also follows a censored binomial distribution, now from 1
to R, since an application cannot end up in a ￿rm with no applications at all. The













if 0 < K < R (3)














if K = R, (4)
8This implies that R must be higher or equal than 10. If not, the type of the ￿rm would
be R.
9where AK denotes the probability that a particular application is a type K applica-
tion and the type denotes the type of the ￿rm that received the application.
Both ￿rms and applications types are ex-post types. They are revealed in step
three and only to ￿rms. Workers are not aware of types in any moment, so they are
not aware of it when making their choice. In fact it is the choice of workers what
determines the type of ￿rms and applications. Therefore, workers do not know
neither the types of the ￿rms where they have sent their applications, neither the
types of applications they hold. However, workers can anticipate the probability
distributions when they make their choices. Firms learn their own type and the
type of the applications they hold, but they do not know the type of the ￿rms with
which they compete for a particular worker neither the type of applications that the
worker holds.
An application of type K, given that it was not successful in previous rounds,





0 if K < T and K < R
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￿N￿i if K = R.
(5)
In a given round T, a ￿rm of type K has a probability GT;K of being active.
This probability can be computed as:
GT;K =
8
> > > > <
> > > > :
1 if T = 1
T￿1 Y
i=1
(1 ￿ Mi;K) if 1 < T ￿ K
0 if T > K.
(6)
Here Mi;K is the probability that a type K ￿rm has left the market in round
i. Basically GT;K computes the probability that a ￿rm of type K has not left the
market in any of the previous T ￿ 1 rounds.





1 if T = 1
T￿1 Y
i=1
(1 ￿ Di) if T > 1,
(7)
where Di is the probability that an agent has left the market in period i. Again,
BT computes the probability that a worker has not left the market in the previous
T ￿ 1 rounds.
In a particular round T, an agent can receive wage o⁄ers from di⁄erent types of
￿rms that are still in the market. A particular application, given that it was not
successful in previous rounds, has a probability LT;K of receiving an o⁄er from a type
K ￿rm. This probability takes into account the probability that the application is a
type K application, the probability that a type K application is successful in round
T and the probability that the particular K type ￿rm is still in the market. LT;K is
expressed as:
LT;K = OT;KAKGT;K. (8)
In a given round T, a worker that is still in the market, receives an o⁄er from a
￿rm of type K or lower with probability:








A worker that is still in the market has not received an o⁄er in any previous
round. This implies that all her S applications may receive o⁄ers in the current
round. However, the probability that a particular application is successful changes
in each round.
The highest o⁄er that the agent receives, that might form a match, comes from
a ￿rm of type K with probability:
ZT;K = RT;K ￿ RT;K￿1. (10)
11To form a match the agent must be still in the market at round T. This implies
that a match with a type K ￿rm is formed with probability M
￿
T;K = ZT;KBT. In




T;KN. Since there are GT;KFKV type K ￿rms that are active in the market at








In a given round T a worker, that was still in the market, receives at least one
o⁄er, forming a match and leaving the market with probability:
DT = RT;R. (12)
Since RT;R represents the probability of receiving at least one o⁄er from type R
or lower, it is also the probability of receiving an o⁄er from any ￿rm type.
An active ￿rm in round T must take into account that she holds one of the
applications of the workers in her list. This implies that the probability that this
particular worker receives o⁄ers is di⁄erent than the one exposed above. That
particular agent might have received, in previous rounds, an o⁄er from a ￿rm type
K or lower with probability:
R
F








The di⁄erence with RT;K is due to the fact that the number of active applications
is lower, in particular there is one less application. For an outside observer, a
worker can receive wage o⁄ers from all her S applications. However, the ￿rm holds
one application, so she knows that the worker can receive o⁄ers only from S ￿ 1
applications. This fact reduces her probability of receiving o⁄ers in previous rounds.







Given these facts, from ￿rms point of view, the worker to which they make an
o⁄er is in the market with probability BF











i ) if T > 1.
(15)
Following a similar construction, it turns out that this result holds for all rounds
if R < V ￿ S. If R > V ￿ S there are distortions in the probabilities for high
types at high rounds. When T > V ￿ S, those ￿rms that are still active know that
there cannot be more than V ￿T competing ￿rms in the market. The extreme case
is when T = R = V . A ￿rm of type K = V knows that in the last round she
will hold at least one application and that all those applications belong to workers
that are still in the market. This is because her list had more applications than
competing ￿rms in the market. The applicants that rejected her o⁄er in each of the
V ￿ 1 previous rounds have formed matches with the V ￿ 1 competing ￿rms. The
remaining applicants must then be unemployed. Since there are no more competing
￿rms in the market, any of the applicants will accept the reservation wage o⁄er.
The optimal strategy for a ￿rm of type V is to o⁄er w in all subsequent rounds. In
a round where T > V ￿ S, the probability that an agent receives an o⁄er from a
type K or lower is computed, from the ￿rms point of view, as:
R
F








Then, in a situation where ￿ < 1 and from the workers point of view, it is not
optimal to make V applications, even if applications were for free. If all workers
apply to all vacancies and R = V , the optimal behavior of ￿rms is to o⁄er the
reservation wage in all rounds. Workers are better o⁄ if the do not apply at all.
This construction implies a non-monotonicity in the probabilities computed from
the point of view of ￿rms. The probability that a particular worker is in the market
13decreases from the ￿rst round to the round V ￿ S and increases from round V ￿ S
till round R, reaching 1 if R = V .
3 Firms choice
In each round T, ￿rms choose wage o⁄ers from the set:
￿T;K (W) = argmaxf(Q ￿ W)PT(W) ￿ (1 ￿ PT(W))￿T;Kg. (17)
This can be rewritten as:
￿T;K (W) = argmaxf(Q ￿ ￿T;K ￿ W)PT(W) + ￿T;Kg. (18)
In both cases PT(W) is the probability that a wage o⁄er W is accepted in the
current round and ￿T;K is the pro￿t that, at round T, a type K ￿rm expects to
obtain from further rounds. This expected pro￿t is strictly positive as long as there
are applications in her list and zero otherwise.
￿T;K
(
> 0 if K < T
= 0 otherwise.
(19)
The expected pro￿t is increasing with K and decreasing with T, as long as
K < V . It is constant if K = V .
This implies that the higher is the type of the ￿rm, the higher is the expected
pro￿t from further rounds. Firms with a high type behave then less aggressively that
those with fewer applications. Firms choose their wage o⁄ers from non-overlapping
wage o⁄er sets, competing among ￿rms of the same type. They lose against o⁄ers
from lower types and they win against o⁄ers from higher types. For example, those
￿rms that have just one application left in their list do not receive any expected pro￿t
from the next round. If they do not form a match in that round, their vacancy is
not ful￿lled. They have to do very aggressive wage o⁄ers, o⁄ers that are higher or
14equal than the highest o⁄er that the rest of ￿rms types make, as they are more eager
to form a match.
In each round, wage o⁄ers are extracted from di⁄erent wage o⁄er sets. In a
particular round T there are 1+R￿T di⁄erent wage o⁄er sets, one for each type of
￿rm that might be still in the market. These wage o⁄er sets have supports that do
not overlap, except in their boundaries. From the point of view of workers or of an
external observer, wage o⁄ers are extracted from a continuous distribution function.
The distribution function is composed by the wage o⁄er distributions related to each
type of ￿rm.
The wage o⁄er behavior in each round is de￿ned according to the type of ￿rm,
the probabilities related to that particular period and the expected pro￿t relative
to further rounds. In a particular round T, active ￿rms behave according to their





Q ￿ ￿T;K ￿ wT;K+1





A (1 ￿ LT;K)
LT;K
, (20)
where wT;K+1 is the highest wage o⁄er made by K+1 type ￿rms, ￿T;K is the expected
pro￿t from further rounds and LT;K the probability that a particular application
receives an o⁄er from a type K ￿rm in round T. Firms of type K make o⁄ers from
wT;K+1 to wT;K. The upper bound is set as:
wT;K = (Q ￿ ￿T;K) ￿ (Q ￿ ￿T;K ￿ wT;K+1)(1 ￿ LT;K)
S￿1 . (21)
In each round, ￿rms of type R make the lowest o⁄ers. For a ￿rm of type R, the
lowest o⁄er cannot be wT;K+1, since there are no higher types. For a ￿rm of type
R the lowest o⁄er is w. Firms of type R make o⁄ers from w to wT;R, where wT;R is
computed as :
wT;R = (Q ￿ ￿T;R) ￿ (Q ￿ ￿T;R ￿ w)(1 ￿ LT;R)
S￿1 . (22)
The expected pro￿t from this round, to be used in previous rounds, can be
15computed as:











To de￿ne ￿rms wage o⁄er behavior for a given round, both ￿T;K and LT;K are
required. The second one depends on the probabilities related to previous rounds
and the ￿rst one depends on the probabilities and the behavior in further rounds.
This implies that probabilities for all possible rounds must be solved and then we
have to solve for the behavior in each round, starting from round R and proceeding
backwards until round 1. The number of bargaining rounds can be very large. Then,
to illustrate how the process works I present the solution for a two-period model.
4 Two period model
The length of the list is at most two, R = 2. This divides ￿rms into just three types:
i) Firms with no applications, called type 0 ￿rms; ii) ￿rms with one application,
type 1 ￿rms and iii) ￿rms with two or more applications, type 2 ￿rms.
































Recall that F0 is the probability that a particular ￿rm is a type 0 ￿rm, that is,
the probability that a ￿rm does not receive any application, being not active in any
round; F1 is the probability that a ￿rm is a type 1 ￿rm, that is, the probability that
a ￿rm has received only one application, being then active only in the ￿rst round;
16F2 is the probability that a ￿rm is a type 2 ￿rm. Type 2 includes all ￿rms with two
or more applications and not just those ￿rms with two applications.
Applications can be of just two types, according to the type of ￿rm where they
end up. A type 1 application is received by a ￿rm that has no other applicants, while
a type 2 application is received by a type 2 ￿rm. The probabilities corresponding















where A1 is the probability that a particular application is the unique application
received by the ￿rm and A2 includes all other possible cases.
In the ￿rst round G1;1 = G2;1 = 1. That is, all ￿rms with applications are active
in the ￿rst round. Moreover, B1 = 1, meaning that all workers are active in the ￿rst
round.
An application is successful in round 1, given the type, according to probabilities:




















An application of type 1 is successful for sure in the ￿rst round, since there are no
other applicants. An application of type 2 is successful in the ￿rst round, depending
on the number of other applicants that a type 2 ￿rm may have.
The probability that a type 2 application is successful in round 2, given that it




















Given that construction of probabilities, in the ￿rst round an application receives
an o⁄er from a type K ￿rm with probability:
L1;K = O1;KAKG1;K for K 2 f1;2g. (32)
That is:
L1;1 = O1;1A1G1;1 = A1, (33)
and
L1;2 = O1;2A2G1;2 = O1;2A2. (34)
This implies that a particular worker receives at least one o⁄er from a type 1
￿rm with probability:








= 1 ￿ (1 ￿ L1;1)
S
= 1 ￿ (1 ￿ A1)
S .
In the same way, it receives at least one wage o⁄er from a ￿rm of type 2 or lower
with probability:








= 1 ￿ (1 ￿ L1;1 ￿ L1;2)
= 1 ￿ (1 ￿ A1 ￿ O1;2A2)
S .
18The highest o⁄er received comes from a type 1 ￿rm with probability:
Z1;1 = R1;1, (37)
and from a type 2 ￿rm with probability:
Z1;2 = R1;2 ￿ R1;1 (38)
= (1 ￿ A1)
S ￿ (1 ￿ A1 ￿ O1;2A2)
S .
These probabilities are also the probabilities of a match, because all workers are
in the market in the ￿rst round. This implies that M
￿
T;K = ZT;K. The total number
of matches with ￿rms of types 1 and 2 in the ￿rst round are:
M
￿
1;1 = Z1;1N =
￿







1;2 = Z1;2N =
￿
(1 ￿ A1)





At the end of round 1, all type 1 ￿rms exit the market, since they cannot be
active in round 2. At the end of round 1, a type 2 ￿rm exists the market if she had





Then, a type 2 ￿rm is still active in the second round with probability G2;2 =
1 ￿ M1;2.
Workers exit the market in the ￿rst round with probability D1 = R1;2. Then, a
worker is still in the market in the second round with probability:
19B2 = 1 ￿ R1;2:
In the second round, an application receives an o⁄er from a type 2 ￿rm with
probability:
L2;2 = O2;2A2G2;2.
In the second round workers receive a type 2 o⁄er with probability:








= 1 ￿ (1 ￿ L2;2)
S ,
forming a match with probability:
M2;2 = R2;2B2. (43)
This is the general probability construction of the model.
Firms behave according to their perception of the probabilities, that are slightly
di⁄erent since they hold one of the applications send by the worker. When choosing
the wage o⁄er in the second round, a ￿rm knows that this particular worker may
have formed a match in the previous period with probability:
R
F








= 1 ￿ (1 ￿ L1;1 ￿ L1;2)
= 1 ￿ (1 ￿ A1 ￿ O1;2A2)
S￿1 ,
being still in the market with probability BF
2 = 1 ￿ RF
1;2.
I can compute also the probability that a worker receives an o⁄er from other
type 2 ￿rms in round 2 as:
20R
F








= 1 ￿ (1 ￿ L2;2)
= 1 ￿ (1 ￿ O2;2A2G2;2)
S￿1 .
In the second round, a type 2 ￿rm chooses her wage from:
￿2;2 (W) = argmaxf(Q ￿ W)P2(W)g. (46)
The pro￿t associated to the reservation wage is given by:









The pro￿t associated to any wage o⁄er is given by:
￿(W) = (Q ￿ W)P2(W). (48)

































that can be expressed as:




Combining Equations (49) and (50), the optimal wage o⁄er strategy for type 2













Type 2 ￿rms expected pro￿t form the second round, when they are in the ￿rst
round, is given by:









In the ￿rst round type 2 ￿rms choose their wage o⁄er from:
￿1;2 (W) = argmaxf(Q ￿ W)P1(W) ￿ (1 ￿ P1(W))￿1;2g, (54)
and a type 1 ￿rm from:
￿1;1 (W) = argmaxf(Q ￿ W)P1(W)g. (55)
Type 2 ￿rms will o⁄er wages from w to w1;2 where:
w1;2 = (Q ￿ ￿1;2) ￿ (Q ￿ ￿1;2 ￿ w)(1 ￿ L1;2)
S￿1 , (56)
and type 1 ￿rms will o⁄er wages from w1;2 to w1;1 where:
w1;1 = Q ￿ (Q ￿ wL)(1 ￿ L1;1)
S￿1 . (57)





Q ￿ ￿1;2 ￿ w





A (1 ￿ L1;2)
L1;2
, (58)











A (1 ￿ L1;1)
L1;1
, (59)










from w1;2 to w1;1, and
H1;2(W) =
￿
Q ￿ ￿1;2 ￿ w




S (1 ￿ L1;2)
S , (61)









from w to w2;2, in the case that the o⁄er is received in the second period.





















dW ￿ Sc. (63)
To illustrate this results I present some numerical examples. The presented
results are simulations of models with two and ￿ve wage o⁄er rounds, respectively.
In particular I set exogenously S = 5, N = 100, V = 100 and the mentioned two
or ￿ve wage o⁄er rounds, R = 2 or R = 5. Production is normalized to one, Q = 1,
23and the reservation wage is set to zero, w = 0. In ￿gures 1 to 5, I present the results
obtained in a simulation of a model with two wage o⁄er rounds. In Figure 6 and
tables 1 to 3, I present the results obtained in a simulation of a model with ￿ve wage
o⁄er rounds.
In a model with only two wage o⁄er rounds there are only two kind of ￿rms that
can interact, since there is no interaction at all with type 0 ￿rms. The probability of
being a type 1 ￿rm is low in both absolute and relative terms. Part of the mentioned
e⁄ect on the wage behavior corresponds to the behavior of type 1 ￿rms during the
￿rst round. The parameters of the simulation are low in order to obtain a relatively
high number of type 1 ￿rms, implying a clearer e⁄ect on the wage o⁄er behavior
and on the expected return of workers. This is done just with illustrative purposes,
since the e⁄ect exists in any case. In the case of ￿ve rounds, the e⁄ects on both the
wage o⁄ers and the expected return of workers is very much ampli￿ed, as we see
below.
In Figure 1 I present the cumulative distribution function of the wage o⁄er of
type 2 ￿rms in round 2 , that is J2;2(W). In period two, type 2 ￿rms o⁄er wages
from the reservation wage to a value slightly above 0:3 (0:3028).
Figure 1: Wage o⁄er in second period.
24The shape of the obtained CDF is close to a straight line. Wage o⁄ers are, there-
fore, close to a uniform distribution.
In Figure 2 I present the cumulative distribution function of the wage o⁄er of
type 2 ￿rms in round 1, that is J1;2(W). In period one, type 2 ￿rms o⁄er wages
from the reservation wage to a value close to 0:4 (0:4098).
Figure 2: Type 2 ￿rms wage o⁄er in the ￿rst round.
Type 2 ￿rms make higher wage o⁄ers in the ￿rst round than in the second one,
and this is due to the reduction in competition in the second round. There are less
competing ￿rms so the agent has a lower probability of receiving o⁄ers. However,
there are also less workers in the market. This has an e⁄ect in the expected pro￿t,
but it has no clear e⁄ect on the wage o⁄er behavior. The shape of the CDF is close
to be linear and shows a high density concentration on higher wage o⁄ers.
In Figure 3 I present the cumulative distribution function of the wage o⁄er for a
type 1 ￿rm in round 1, that is J1;1(W). In period 1, type 1 ￿rms o⁄er wages from
the upper bound of type 2 ￿rms (0:4098), up to a value close to 0:4 (0:4244). Since
there are few type 1 ￿rms in the market, they do not expect much competition. The
probability that a particular worker receives two o⁄ers from type 1 ￿rms is very low.
25The wage o⁄ers of type one ￿rms are then concentrated on a narrower set of values.
Figure 3: Type 1 Firms wage o⁄er in the ￿rst round.
Again the shape of the function is close to a line, which implies that it is well
approximated by a uniform distribution.
In Figure 4 I present the cumulative distribution that the worker expects to get
from a particular o⁄er, taking into account that the o⁄er can be made in the ￿rst
or the second period, being then a combination of J1;1(W), J1;2(W) and J2;2(W).
26Figure 4: Expected wage o⁄er distribution related to a particular application.
In Figure 5 I present the distribution of the expected wage for the worker, that is,
the distribution of the highest o⁄er. This is also a combination of J1;1(W), J1;2(W)
and J2;2(W).
27Figure 5: Expected wage distribution.
We see that, for values close to the upper bound a less steep curvature is obtained,
denoting a lower density concentration on extreme values. Still the wages are heavily
concentrated close to the upper bound of the wage o⁄ers. If more wage o⁄er rounds
are allowed, the wage o⁄er behavior of ￿rms is such that there is less concentration
on the extreme wage values. This can be observed in a model with ￿ve wage o⁄er
rounds.
In Figure 6 I present the expected o⁄er from a particular application if there are
￿ve rounds of wage o⁄ers. I use the same parameter values as above.
28Figure 6: The expected o⁄er from a particular application in a ￿ve o⁄er-round market.
When there are ￿ve rounds, the highest wage o⁄ered is slightly above 0:28
(0:2808), which is much lower than the upper bound obtained in a two round game.
The existence of further rounds gives more bargaining power to ￿rms. Their wage
o⁄ers are lower and the shape of the expected return suggests a higher concentration
on middle values of the wage domain.
In Table 1 I present the probabilities of ￿rms types (F) and applications types
(A) in a ￿ve round model:
Types 0 1 2 3 4 5
Firms (F) 0:0059 0:0312 0:0812 0:1396 0:1781 0:5640
Applications (A) ￿ 0:0062 0:0325 0:0837 0:1425 0:7350
(64)
Table 1: Distribution of ￿rms and applications types
Firms of type 5 include more than half of all ￿rms. However, they receive nearly
three fourths of all applications. A particular application is a type 1 application,
29receiving then a type 1 ￿rm o⁄er, with a probability slightly over 0:6%. There is
nearly a 0:6% of ￿rms that do not receive any application, remaining then un￿lled.
In Table 2 I present the probabilities that ￿rms form a match in a given round,
provided that they are active:
Round 1 2 3 4 5
Firm type 1 0:9876 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
Firm type 2 0:9439 0:6578 ￿ ￿ ￿
Firm type 3 0:8624 0:4859 0:6335 ￿ ￿
Firm type 4 0:7544 0:4170 0:4153 0:5965 ￿
Firm type 5 0:5456 0:3118 0:2726 0:2635 0:3187
(65)
Table 2: Matching probabilities by round
For example, a type 2 ￿rm forms a match in the ￿rst round with probability
0:9439: All those type 2 ￿rms that do not form a match in the ￿rst round, go to the
second round forming a match with probability 0:6578.
There is a strong last-round e⁄ect in probabilities, related to the fact of being the
lowest type in a given round. For ￿rms of type 3 or higher, the probability to form
a match in the last active round is higher than the probability of forming a match
in the previous period. This e⁄ect is due to the aggressive bidding that overruns
the bid of all other types, or in the case of type 5 ￿rms, to the lack of competition
from other types of ￿rms.
In Table 3 I present the probability that a worker leaves the market, if it was
active, and the probability that a particular worker is still active in a given round :
Round 1 2 3 4 5
Is active in the market 1 0:3301 0:2171 0:1527 0:1105
Leaves the market 0:6699 0:3425 0:2963 0:2764 0:2685
(66)
Table 3: Workers probabilities
Even in the ￿fth round, workers have more than one fourth of chances to form
30a match and more than 10% of workers are still actively searching for a job. After
the ￿fth round, there is still roughly an 8% of workers unemployed. This implies
that after ￿ve rounds, an 8% of the vacancies remain un￿lled. Of this 8%; a 0:6%
corresponds to ￿rms that did not receive any application and a 7:4% to ￿rms that
received applications, but failed to form a match during the ￿ve o⁄er rounds.
5 Conclusion
A hump shaped wage distribution can be obtained in a labor market where both
workers and ￿rms are ex-ante homogeneous.
This requires to develop the labor market in a quite intuitive way, a multiple
application model with recall. Computing all the probability distributions and the
optimal wage o⁄ers for ￿rms I obtain a hump shaped wage distribution, even when
￿rms and workers are perfectly homogenous, ex-ante.
Since recall is allowed, ￿rms are ex-post heterogeneous, depending on the number
of bargaining rounds where they can be active. This implies that each type of ￿rm
gives a di⁄erent value to a match. This is equivalent to say that in each period the
bargaining is equivalent to a sealed bid ￿rst price auction with an unknown number
of bidders, where bidders can have di⁄erent valuations of the good.
The result is a set of mixed strategies, corresponding to di⁄erent type of ￿rms
in di⁄erent rounds. Each ￿rm makes wage o⁄ers as extractions of an endogenously
determined distribution function, that is di⁄erent in each round. The distribution
functions are such that in a given round the di⁄erent domains do not overlap, ￿rms
with higher type make lover wage o⁄ers and loose to all active ￿rms with lower type,
and wins against an active ￿rm with a higher type.
Each type of ￿rm, in each round, uses a mixed strategy that yields a o⁄er dis-
tribution similar to the one obtained in GM-G. The expected wage of an agent is
the higher o⁄er expected, that is a composition of the o⁄er distributions, weighted
according the probabilities of receiving o⁄ers from such ￿rms, yielding the obtained
hump shaped wage distribution.
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